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“What we got here…is a failure to communicate.” 
—Paul Newman as the title character in Cool Hand Luke 
 
Abstract 
This paper reconsiders Joseph Farrell’s (1987) and Matthew Rabin’s (1994) analyses of 
coordination via preplay communication, focusing on Farrell’s analysis of Battle of the Sexes. 
Replacing their equilibrium and rationalizability assumptions with a structural non-equilibrium 
model based on level-k thinking, I reevaluate FR’s assumptions on how players use language and 
their conclusions on the limits of communication in bringing about coordination. The analysis 
partly supports their assumptions about how players use language, but suggests that their 
“agreements” do not reflect a full meeting of the minds. A level-k analysis also yields very 
different conclusions about the effectiveness of communication. 
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  0  Tacit coordination is ubiquitous in the animal kingdom, but explicit coordination—the 
use of preplay communication to structure relationships via non-binding agreements—may be 
fully realized only in human societies. Although explicit coordination is an essential part of our 
lives, and there is now a substantial body of experimental evidence on it (Crawford (1998) 
surveys early work), our theoretical understanding remains incomplete. This paper proposes and 
analyzes a model of coordination via pre-play communication that seeks to narrow the gaps 
between theory, evidence, and intuition, building on the work of Joseph Farrell (1987) and 
Matthew Rabin (1994) (see also Farrell (1988) and Rabin (1991)), henceforth collectively “FR”.  
  FR’s analyses address two conjectures regarding complete-information games that are 
still widely held despite FR’s partly negative conclusions: that preplay communication will yield 
an effective agreement to play an equilibrium in the underlying game; and that the agreed-upon 
equilibrium will be Pareto-efficient within that game’s set of equilibria (henceforth “efficient”). 
FR assume that communication takes the form of one or more two-sided, simultaneous 
exchanges of messages about players’ intended actions in the underlying game. The messages 
are in a pre-existing common language and they are nonbinding and costless. FR also assume 
equilibrium, sometimes weakened to rationalizability. They further restrict attention to outcomes 
that satisfy plausible behavioral restrictions defining which combinations of messages create 
agreements, and whether and how agreements can be changed.
1 Under these assumptions FR 
show that rationalizable preplay communication need not assure equilibrium; and that, although 
communication enhances coordination, even equilibrium with “abundant” (Rabin’s term for 
“unlimited”) communication does not assure that the outcome will be Pareto-efficient. 
In the part of FR’s analyses that is most important for this paper, Farrell (1987) uses 
Battle of the Sexes to study symmetry-breaking via one or more rounds of two-sided preplay 
communication with conflicting preferences about how to coordinate.
2 He focuses on the 
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in the entire game, including the communication phase, in 
which the first pair of messages in the same communication round that identify a pure-strategy 
equilibrium in Battle of the Sexes are treated as an agreement to play that equilibrium, ignoring 
                                                 
1 These restrictions make subgame-perfection superfluous. Rabin (1994, pp. 389-290) discusses the rationale for 
studying models in which two-sided messages are simultaneous rather than sequential. As he notes (and as Thomas 
C. Schelling (1960) noted), if there are no delay costs, as in FR’s and my analyses, with sequential messages the 
outcome may be arbitrarily determined by assumptions about who can speak last or how players form their beliefs.    
2 Farrell’s analysis also sheds light on the symmetry-breaking role of communication in the pure coordination games 
studied by Schelling (1960) and others. 
  1all previous messages. He calculates the equilibrium rate of efficient coordination with one or 
more rounds of communication, showing that the rate increases steadily with the number of 
rounds but converges to a limit less than one even with abundant communication.
3 
Because Farrell’s analysis is specific to Battle of the Sexes and assumes equilibrium, it is 
reasonable to ask how general his insights are. Rabin (1994) extends Farrell’s analysis to a wide 
class of underlying games while dropping his symmetry restriction; augmenting his restrictions 
on how players use language to allow them to make interim agreements, which can be improved 
upon in subsequent agreements; and considering the implications of rationalizability as well as 
equilibrium.
4 Rabin defines notions called negotiated equilibrium and negotiated 
rationalizability that combine the standard notions with his restrictions on how players use 
language. He shows that with abundant communication, each player’s negotiated equilibrium 
expected payoff is at least as high as in his worst efficient equilibrium in the underlying game. 
He then shows, replacing negotiated equilibrium by negotiated rationalizability, that even 
without equilibrium, each player expects (perhaps incorrectly) a payoff at least as high as in his 
worst efficient equilibrium. Thus Farrell’s insights are quite general: “…the potential efficiency 
gains from communication illustrated by [Farrell (1987)] do not rely on ad hoc assumptions of 
symmetry or on selecting a particular type of mixed-strategy equilibrium. Rather, the efficiency 
gains…inhere in the basic assumptions about how players use language.” (Rabin, p. 373)). 
Although equilibrium and rationalizability are the natural places to start in analyses like 
FR’s, recent experiments suggest that in settings without clear precedents people often deviate 
systematically from equilibrium, especially when the reasoning behind it is not straightforward. 
The evidence also suggests that in such settings a structural non-equilibrium model can often 
out-predict equilibrium.
5 While the existence of an empirically successful alternative to treating 
deviations as errors makes equilibrium seem too strong an assumption, rationalizability may be 
too weak. This paper takes a middle course, reconsidering FR’s analyses with particular attention 
to Farrell’s analysis of Battle of the Sexes, but replacing equilibrium or rationalizability with a 
non-equilibrium model based on level-k thinking. Although level-k models have not yet been 
                                                 
3 Symmetry is a natural restriction when players cannot distinguish their roles, and avoids begging the question of 
symmetry-breaking. Crawford and Hans Haller (1990, p. 580) provide a justification for the symmetry assumption.     
4 Rabin’s model of communication is similar to Ehud Kalai and Dov Samet’s (1985). They assume agreements are 
binding, though renegotiable; but this difference is unimportant here because in coordination games the potential 
agreements are equilibria, and Rabin’s assumptions make agreements to play them effectively binding, though 
renegotiable. Miguel A. Costa-Gomes (2002) extends Rabin’s theory and tests it with experimental data. 
  2thoroughly tested in this setting, they explain much of the predictable part of subjects’ deviations 
from equilibrium in experiments that elicit initial responses to games in other settings, and their 
strong experimental support makes them a natural candidate.
6 
A level-k analysis allows a unified treatment of players’ messages and actions and how 
messages create agreements, deriving all three from simple assumptions that explain behavior in 
other settings. The analysis also allows a reevaluation of FR’s plausible but ad hoc restrictions on 
how players use language. With one round of communication, the analysis justifies FR’s 
assumption that a message pair that identifies an equilibrium leads to that equilibrium. However, 
the resulting “agreements” do not fully reflect the meeting of the minds that FR sought to model. 
Instead they reflect either one player’s perceived credibility as a sender or the other’s perceived 
credulity as a receiver, never both at the same time. As a result, a level-k analysis may not fully 
support the assumptions about agreements in Rabin’s analysis of negotiated rationalizability.
7 
Turning to abundant communication, I assume in the spirit (but not the letter) of Rabin’s 
analysis that players always have the option of an additional round of communication by mutual 
consent, but that in any round either player can unilaterally shut off communication and force 
play of the underlying game. As Rabin’s analysis of negotiated rationalizability suggests, level-k 
players need not keep communicating until an agreement is reached as in Farrell’s equilibrium. 
Finally, a level-k analysis implies very different conclusions about the effectiveness of 
communication than Farrell’s equilibrium analysis. A level-k analysis suggests that coordination 
rates in Battle of the Sexes, with or without communication, will be largely independent of the 
difference in players’ preferences, while in Farrell’s equilibrium analysis coordination rates are 
highly sensitive to this difference. A level-k analysis already has surprising implications for tacit 
coordination: Even with moderate differences in preferences, the level-k coordination rate 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 With enough clear precedents, equilibrium is more reliable; but explicit agreements may then be unnecessary. 
6 Level-k models, described in Section I, also tend to out-predict equilibrium models with payoff-sensitive error 
distributions such as quantal response equilibrium. They were introduced to explain experimental data by Dale O. 
Stahl II and Paul W. Wilson (1994, 1995) and Rosemarie Nagel (1995) and further developed by Teck-Hua Ho, 
Colin Camerer, and Keith Weigelt (1998); Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Bruno Broseta (2001; “CGCB”); Crawford 
(2003); Camerer, Ho, and Juin Kuan Chong (2004; “CHC”) under the name “cognitive hierarchy”; Costa-Gomes 
and Georg Weizsäcker (2005); Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006; “CGC”); Crawford and Nagore Iriberri (2007ab); 
and Crawford, Uri Gneezy, and Yuval Rottenstreich (2007). CGC (Introduction, Section II.D) review the evidence.  
7 Negotiated rationalizability is potentially relevant here because level-k types choose k–rationalizable strategies (B. 
Douglas Bernheim (1984); CGC, Section I) and k–rationalizability, even for moderate k, is close to rationalizability 
in this setting. However, Rabin’s analysis is not conclusive here because it requires levels of k higher than those that 
are realistic, and negotiated rationalizability builds the assumption that agreements are effective into players’ beliefs, 
but in the level-k analysis agreements reflect weaker restrictions that may not always satisfy Rabin’s assumption.  
  3without communication is likely to be higher, for empirically plausible type distributions, than 
the mixed-strategy equilibrium rate. Further, with one round of communication, the level-k rate 
is well above the rate without communication, and is likely to be higher than the equilibrium rate 
with one round of communication unless preferences are very close. Finally, with abundant 
communication, the level-k coordination rate is likely to be higher than the equilibrium rate 
unless preferences are moderately close. The model’s predictions with abundant communication 
are consistent with Rabin’s bounds based on negotiated rationalizability, but their precision 
yields additional insight into the causes and consequences of breakdowns in negotiations.  
This paper’s closest relatives other than FR are Crawford (2003) and Tore Ellingsen and 
Robert Östling (2006), henceforth “EÖ”. Crawford (2003) introduces a level-k model of one-
sided communication of intentions and uses it to study deception in zero-sum games. EÖ 
generalize Crawford’s model to allow two-sided communication and use it to study two central 
issues in coordination: symmetry-breaking in games like Battle of the Sexes; and reassurance in 
games like Stag Hunt, where there is a tension between the higher payoffs and greater fragility of 
the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. They show that in a level-k model, as in equilibrium with 
suitable refinements, one-sided communication almost trivially solves the coordination problem 
in Battle of the Sexes, and is therefore more effective than two-sided communication, as is 
usually found in experiments (Crawford (1998, Section 3). They also show that, unlike 
equilibrium with suitable refinements, a level-k model can also explain why two-sided 
communication is more effective than one-sided in Stag Hunt, as is also found in experiments. 
EÖ focus on the implications of these results for organizational design. This paper adapts EÖ’s 
generalized model of two-sided communication to a different purpose: reevaluating FR’s 
assumptions about how players use language and providing a more realistic characterization of 
the effectiveness of communication in bringing about coordination via symmetry-breaking.
8 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces the level-k model by using it to 
analyze Battle of the Sexes without preplay communication, following CHC’s (Section III.C) 
level-k (or as they call it, “cognitive hierarchy”) analysis of closely related market-entry games. 
It has long been noted that subjects in market-entry experiments (Amnon Rapoport et al. (1998) 
                                                 
8 I do not consider one-sided communication because it begs the question of symmetry-breaking that is at the heart 
of the coordination problem in Battle of the Sexes. Nonetheless, as EÖ show, the model used here has the “right” 
implications to explain experimental results with one-sided as well as two-sided communication. Navin Kartik, 
  4and Rapoport and Darryl A. Seale (2002)) regularly achieve better ex post coordination (number 
of entrants closer to market capacity) than in the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, the 
natural equilibrium benchmark. Earlier versions of this result led Daniel Kahneman (1988) to 
remark, “…to a psychologist, it looks like magic.” CHC show that Kahneman’s “magic” can be 
explained by a level-k model, in which the predictable heterogeneity of strategic thinking allows 
some players to mentally simulate others’ entry decisions and accommodate them. The more 
sophisticated players become like Stackelberg followers, with coordination benefits for all.  
Section I’s analysis adapts CHC’s analysis to Battle of the Sexes, showing that level-k 
thinking yields similar symmetry-breaking benefits there. The analysis suggests a view of tacit 
coordination profoundly different from the traditional view: With level-k thinking, equilibrium 
and, a fortiori, selection principles such as risk- or payoff-dominance (John Harsanyi and 
Reinhard Selten (1988)) play no direct role in players’ strategic thinking. Coordination, when it 
occurs, is an almost accidental (though predictable) by-product of the use of non-equilibrium 
decision rules. These striking differences motivate a level-k analysis of explicit coordination: At 
the very least, a level-k analysis will shift the equilibrium benchmarks in Farrell’s analysis. 
Section II reviews Farrell’s equilibrium analysis of communication in Battle of the Sexes 
and the implications of Rabin’s analysis of negotiated rationalizability in this setting. 
Section III presents a level-k analysis of Battle of the Sexes with one round of 
communication. It then compares the resulting coordination outcomes with Section I’s level-k 
outcomes for Battle of the Sexes without communication, and with Section II’s equilibrium 
outcomes with one round. Finally, it uses the level-k model to reevaluate Farrell’s assumptions 
regarding which combinations of messages create agreements. 
Section IV extends Section III’s analysis to allow abundant communication, modeled as 
allowing players the option, at the end of any communication round, of an additional round by 
mutual consent. It then compares the resulting coordination outcomes with the level-k outcomes 
with one round of communication, and with the outcomes in Farrell’s equilibrium 
characterization of the limits of abundant communication.  
Section V is the conclusion. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Marco Ottaviani, and Francesco Squintani (2007) and those authors’ earlier papers cited there introduced level-k 
models of one-sided strategic information transmission, in the limited sense of credulous receivers. 
  5I. A Level-k Model of Tacit Coordination 
This section introduces the level-k model by using it to analyze Battle of the Sexes 
without communication, following CHC’s (Section III.C) analysis of market-entry games. 
Level-k models allow behavior to be heterogeneous, but they assume that each player 
follows a rule drawn from a common distribution over a particular hierarchy of decision rules or 
types. I assume throughout that both player roles are filled from the same distribution of types, 
which restricts attention to symmetric outcome distributions, paralleling Farrell’s restriction to 
the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.  
As implemented here, type Lk anchors its beliefs in a nonstrategic L0 type and adjusts 
them via thought-experiments with iterated best responses: L1 best responds to L0, L2 to L1, and 
so on. L1 and higher types have accurate models of the game and are rational in that they choose 
best responses to beliefs. Their only departure from equilibrium is in replacing its assumed 
perfect model of others with simplified models that avoid the complexity of equilibrium analysis.  
In applications the type frequencies are treated as behavioral parameters (or in CHC’s 
cognitive hierarchy model, a parameterized distribution) to be estimated or translated from 
previous analyses. The estimated distribution is fairly stable across games, with most weight on 
L1, L2, and L3. The estimated frequency of the anchoring L0 type is usually 0 or very small; thus 
L0 exists mainly as L1’s model of others, L2’s model of L1’s model, and so on. Even so, the 
specification of L0 is the main issue in defining a level-k model and the key to its explanatory 
power. L0 often needs to be adapted to the setting; but the definition of higher types via iterated 
best responses allows an empirically plausible explanation of behavior in most settings. 
In CHC’s market-entry games, n risk-neutral firms simultaneously decide whether to 
enter a market with capacity m < n. If m or fewer firms enter, the entrants all earn a profit; but if 
more than m enter they all earn a loss. Staying out yields zero. Like Battle of the Sexes, this 
game has a unique symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies, in which the expected number of 
entrants is approximately m, but there are significant probabilities of over- or under-entry 
(Avinash Dixit and Carl Shapiro (1985)). Yet in Rapoport et al.’s (1998) and Rapoport and 
Seale’s (2002) experiments with closely related games, the numbers of entrants ex post were 
systematically closer to m than in the symmetric equilibrium. 
How can subjects do systematically better than in the symmetric equilibrium? CHC show 
that this can be explained by a level-k model with an empirically plausible type distribution. In 
  6their model, L0 is uniformly random, the usual assumption for normal-form games. L1s mentally 
simulate L0s’ random entry decisions and accommodate them, entering only if they expect 
enough L0s to stay out. L2s accommodate L1s’ (and in CHC’s model, unlike in mine, L0s’) entry 
decisions; and so on. Even though players’ decisions are simultaneous and there is no 
communication, the heterogeneity of strategic thinking allows more sophisticated types to 
accommodate less sophisticated types’ decisions, just as (noisy) Stackelberg followers would. 
Now consider the closely related Battle of the Sexes game in Figure 1, where a > 1 
without loss of generality. Two players choose simultaneously between two pure actions, H for 
Hawk or D for Dove, using the standard labeling of the strategies from evolutionary game theory 
to emphasize the symmetry of actions and payoffs across player roles. The unique symmetric 
equilibrium is in mixed strategies, with p ≡ Pr{H} = a/(1+a) for both players. The expected 
coordination rate is 2p(1–p) = 2a/(1+a)
2, and players’ expected payoffs are a/(1+a) < 1, worse 
for each player than his worst pure-strategy equilibrium. 
 
   Column 









Figure 1. Battle of the Sexes (a > 1) 
 
In the level-k model, each player follows one of four types, L1, L2, L3, or L4, with each 
player role filled by a draw from the same distribution. I assume, as in most previous analyses, 
that L0 chooses its action randomly, with Pr{H} = Pr{D} = ½. Higher types’ best responses are 
easily calculated: L1 chooses H, L2 chooses D, L3 chooses H, and L4 chooses D (Table 1). 
Although L3 behaves like L1 here, and L4 behaves like L2, I retain all four for comparability 
with the analysis below. But I assume for simplicity, from now on, that the frequency of L0 is 0. 
 
Types  L1 L2 L3 L4 
L1  H, H  H, D  H, H  H, D 
L2  D, H  D, D  D, H  D, D 
L3  H, H  H, D  H, H  H, D 
L4  D, H  D, D  D, H  D, D 
Table 1. Level-k Outcomes without Communication 
  7 
The model’s predicted outcome distribution is determined by the outcomes of the 
possible type pairings in Table 1 and the type frequencies. The type frequencies are assumed to 
be independent of payoffs, in keeping with the fact that, like equilibrium, they are intended as 
general models of strategic behavior (CGCB, CGC). Because in Battle of the Sexes, the 
outcomes of the possible type pairings are independent of a as long as a > 1, the payoff-
independence of the type frequencies implies that the model’s predicted outcome distribution is 
independent of a. By contrast, a has a strong influence on the equilibrium coordination rate, so 
this independence is important in the comparison between level-k and equilibrium rates. 
With symmetry, players have equal ex ante payoffs, which are proportional to the 
expected coordination rate, so little is lost by focusing on the coordination rate. Lumping L1 and 
L3 together and letting v denote their total probability, and lumping L2 and L4 together and 
letting (1-v) denote their total probability, the coordination rate is 2v(1–v), which is maximized at 
v = ½, where it takes the value ½. Thus for v near ½, which is empirically plausible in this 
setting, the coordination rate is close to ½. (However, for more extreme values of v the rate is 
worse, falling to 0 as v → 0 or 1.) By contrast, the mixed-strategy equilibrium coordination rate, 
2a/(1+a)
2, is maximized when a = 1 where it takes the value ½, and equals 4/9 when a = 2 and 
3/8 when a = 3, converging to 0 like 1/a as a → ∞. Thus even for moderate values of a, the level-
k coordination rate is quite likely to be higher than the equilibrium rate. 
A player’s ex ante (not conditioned on his type) expected payoff is (1+a)v(1–v). This too 
is maximized at v = ½, where it equals (1+a)/4, which is always greater than the a/(1+a) 
expected payoff of the mixed-strategy equilibrium. Thus for type frequencies near v = ½, the 
level-k model yields players greater ex ante expected payoffs than the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium; and for a > 3, greater even than in players’ worst pure-strategy equilibria.
9 
From a mechanism-design point of view, the level-k model improves upon the symmetric 
equilibrium by “relaxing” the incentive constraints requiring players’ responses to be in 
equilibrium. Because level-k types best respond to non-equilibrium beliefs, it is natural to 
compare the level-k outcome to the best symmetric rationalizable outcome, in which each player 
plays a non-equilibrium mixed strategy with v ≡ Pr{H} = ½. When v = ½, the level-k model can 
                                                 
9 It is also interesting to evaluate players’ welfare type by type. The expected payoff of an H player (L1 or L3 here) 
is a(1–v) and of a D player (L2 or L4) is v. Thus types differ on the ideal v, each preferring to be on the “rare” side. 
  8be viewed as using the heterogeneity of players’ strategic thinking to purify this best symmetric 
rationalizable outcome. This is not to suggest that level-k thinking always makes this ideal 
outcome attainable: the type frequencies are behavioral parameters, not choice variables.
10  
As noted in the Introduction, the level-k model suggests a view of tacit coordination 
profoundly different from the traditional view: Equilibrium and selection principles such as risk- 
or payoff-dominance play no direct role in players’ strategic thinking; and coordination, when it 
occurs, is an almost accidental by-product of how paired players’ types interact. 
 
II. Farrell’s Equilibrium Analysis of Communication   
This section reviews Farrell’s (1987) analysis of one- and multi-round communication in 
Battle of the Sexes and the implications of Rabin’s (1994) analysis in this setting. 
Farrell’s underlying game has a richer payoff parameterization than the Battle of the 
Sexes game in Figure 1, but the added richness is not relevant here, so I use Figure 1’s game. In 
Farrell’s model, the underlying game is preceded by one or more communication rounds in 
which players send simultaneous messages regarding their pure-strategy intentions. The 
messages are in a pre-existing common language and they are nonbinding and costless. I denote 
the possible messages “h” meaning “I intend to play H” and “d” meaning “I intend to play D”.  
Recall that Farrell studies the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in the entire game, 
including the communication phase, in which players take the first pair of messages that identify 
a pure-strategy equilibrium in the underlying game as an agreement to play that equilibrium, 
ignoring all previous messages. In Farrell’s equilibrium, players randomize their messages in 
each round until either some round yields an equilibrium pair of messages, in which case they 
play that equilibrium; or the communication phase ends without an agreement, in which case 
they revert to the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in Battle of the Sexes. I will describe his 
equilibrium, which is subgame-perfect, by players’ common values of q ≡ Pr{h} in each round 
and their common value of p ≡ Pr{H} if there is no agreement. 
Farrell calculates the equilibrium rate of coordination failure (which is more convenient 
to work with than the rate of coordination) and studies how it depends on the number of rounds 
                                                 
10 The level-k approach has other implications for mechanism design, not developed here. For instance, because 
level-k types (above k = 0) all respect simple dominance, mechanisms that implement desired outcomes in dominant 
strategies may, depending on the mix of types in the population, have an advantage over mechanisms that implement 
superior outcomes but only in equilibrium, especially if the latter use non-transparent devices like integer games. 









2, the equilibrium coordination rate calculated in Section I. 
With one round of communication, coordination fails if and only if players’ message pair 
does not specify an equilibrium and players’ pure actions are not in equilibrium when they then 
play the underlying game without an agreement. Because the second event is conditionally 




2], which because p 
is the same in both cases is always less than the rate without communication of [p
2 + (1–p)
2]. To 
see how much one round of communication reduces the failure rate, it is necessary to calculate 
the equilibrium q. This can be done by reducing the game to a simultaneous-move message game 
by plugging in the payoffs from the possible message pairs. The message game is qualitatively 
like Battle of the Sexes, but with different payoffs because it is not the last chance to coordinate. 
The equilibrium q = a
2/(1+a












which is greater than the equilibrium coordination rate without communication, 2a/(1+a)
2.  





2], with a separate q for each round (Farrell’s (7), p. 38). If 
the qs were independent of the number of rounds and bounded between 0 and 1, then the failure 
rate would approach 0 as the number grew without limit. But each q must be in equilibrium in its 
round’s message game, and although the failure rate declines with the number of rounds, the 
equilibrium qs converge to 1 so quickly that the failure rate converges to a limit above 0 even 
with abundant communication. The limiting failure rate is (a–1)/(a+1), and the corresponding 
coordination rate is 1–[(a–1)/(a+1)] = 2/(1+a), which is greater than the equilibrium coordination 




2]. The limiting expected payoff 
with abundant communication is [(1+a)/2]×[2/(1+a)] = 1, well above the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium payoff a/(1+a). Thus Farrell’s equilibrium with abundant communication exactly 
realizes the bound given by Rabin’s results for negotiated equilibrium, whereby each player 
expects a payoff of at least the 1 of his worst pure-strategy equilibrium in Battle of the Sexes. 
Farrell shows, more generally, that the equilibrium coordination rate is everywhere 
increasing in the number of rounds. When a = 1, the coordination rate is ½ without 
  10communication, ¾ with one round, and 1 with abundant communication. But as a → ∞, even 
with abundant communication the coordination rate approaches 0. 
The sensitivity of coordination rates to payoff differences highlights an incentive 
problem. In Farrell’s model, players use mixed communication strategies to try to create a 
correlating agreement within their relationship to break the symmetry as required for efficient 
coordination.
11 Under his assumptions about how players use language, even proposing a non-
binding agreement has real consequences, and this creates an incentive for players to negotiate 
more aggressively, the more rounds of communication there are. It is this incentive that drives 
their probabilities of sending message h to 1 too quickly for them to reach an efficient agreement 
with probability 1, creating an efficiency gap that increases with a. As a result, unless a is near 1, 
the benefits of abundant communication are limited and most of the gains from communication 
would be realized with only one round: With abundant communication, the coordination rate is 1 
when a = 1, 2/3 when a = 2, and ½ when a = 3, while with one round the rate is 3/4 when a = 1, 
28/45 ≈ 0.62 when a = 2, and 39/80 ≈ 0.49 when a = 3. Even so, Farrell’s analysis shows that 
proposing and making non-binding agreements allows players to realize some of the benefits of 
an ideal binding agreement to play the best symmetric correlated equilibrium, which would yield 
expected payoff (1+a)/2 instead of the 1 they obtain in Farrell’s equilibrium.  
 
III. A Level-k Model with One Round of Communication 
This section introduces a level-k model with one round of two-sided communication and 
uses it to analyze Battle of the Sexes. I focus on two-sided communication because one-sided 
communication begs the question of symmetry-breaking that is at the heart of the coordination 
problem in Battle of the Sexes. The section then compares the level-k coordination outcomes 
with one round of communication with those without communication, and with Section II’s 
equilibrium outcomes for the game with one round. Finally, it uses the level-k model to 
reevaluate Farrell’s assumptions regarding which combinations of messages create agreements. 
A. Modeling two-sided level-k communication 
The key difficulty in analyzing two-sided level-k communication is extending level-k 
types from normal-form games to extensive-form types that determine both messages and 
  11actions. I do this, following EÖ (Section 3.2), by adapting the types in Crawford’s (2003) model 
of one-sided communication.
12 As EÖ note (their footnote 8), a player’s beliefs and best 
responses as a credible sender and a credulous receiver are inconsistent for sent and received 
messages that do not specify an equilibrium action pair, so the analysis must reconcile them in 
some way. Like EÖ, I do this by giving priority to the credible sender type and dispensing with 
the credulous receiver type. Thus I assume that an L0 player uniformly randomizes its action, 
without regard to its partner’s message, and sends a truthful message.
13 This L0 is intuitively 
plausible—bearing in mind that it is only the starting point for players’ strategic thinking—with 
fairly strong experimental support.
14 It is a generalization of Section I’s uniform random L0, the 
usual specification for games without communication. Because Crawford’s one-sided model did 
not need to specify a priority between sent and received messages, it is also a generalization of 
his credible sender type.  
In deriving the behavior of L1 and higher types, I assume that a type always chooses an 
action with the highest expected payoff, given its beliefs. As in previous applications (e.g. CHC, 
EÖ, Crawford and Iriberri (2007b)), I assume that payoff ties are broken randomly, so that a type 
chooses equally desirable actions with equal probabilities. I also assume that the types have a 
slight preference for truthfulness, as in Stefano Demichelis and Jörgen W. Weibull (2007) and 
(in a somewhat different form) in Navin Kartik (2007), so that if telling the truth and lying have 
exactly equal payoffs, a type tells the truth. If, in addition, both messages have equal 
probabilities of being true, I assume that a type sends them with equal probabilities.   
                                                                                                                                                             
11Crawford and Haller (1990) provide an analogous analysis, in which players repeatedly play a tacit coordination 
game, using costly real-time play to generate precedents within their relationship that will eventually allow them to 
break the symmetry as needed; or, in other settings, to find more efficient ways to coordinate.      
12 In analyzing one-sided communication, EÖ (Section 3.2) follow Crawford’s (2003) specification of separate L0s 
for senders and receivers: a “credible” sender, which tells the truth; and a “credulous” receiver, which believes 
whatever it is told. Given these L0s, in Battle of the Sexes an L1 receiver will believe the message it receives and 
accommodate. An L1 sender will expect its message to be believed, and will therefore send message h and choose 
action H. L2 and higher senders will also send h and choose H. Thus L1, L2 and higher receivers will all choose D. 
Thus even one round of one-sided communication almost trivially solves the coordination problem. 
13 If it is assumed instead that L0 uniformly and independently randomizes its message as well as its action, then 
communication is completely ineffective and the model reduces to Section I’s model without communication. The 
credulous receiver type, because it deals with beliefs about another player’s communication strategy, is arguably less 
fundamental than the credible sender type. Crawford and Iriberri (2007b) argue that L0 should be as nonstrategic as 
possible, and show (in a completely different context) that this tends to yield a more useful model. 
14 See the experiments reported in Andreas Blume et al. (2001); Hongbin Cai and Joseph Tao-yi Wang (2006); and 
Wang, Michael Spezio, and Camerer (2006). Truthful L0s also play important roles in Crawford and Iriberri’s 
(2007a) analysis of auctions and in the classical literature on deception; Crawford (2003) gives further references. 
  12With regard to types’ beliefs, I assume that, because each type has a unitary model of 
others (L2 believing others are L1, and so on), it does not draw sophisticated inferences about 
others’ types from their messages.
15 I also assume, on the grounds that message preferences are 
weaker than action preferences, that if a type receives a message that contradicts its beliefs 
regarding its partner’s action, it disregards the message and maintains its beliefs about the action. 
B. Types’ strategies 
I now characterize the behavior of L1 through L4 in Battle of the Sexes with one round of 
communication. Given L0’s strategy of uniformly randomizing its action and sending a truthful 
message, L1 expects its partner’s message to be truthful and its own message to be ignored. It 
therefore accommodates by choosing action D if it receives message h from its partner, and 
choosing action H if it receives message d. Because L1 expects its own message to be ignored, 
truthful and untruthful messages would yield it the same payoffs, and it would therefore prefer to 
be truthful. However, at the time it chooses its own message it has not yet received its partner’s 
message, and so it cannot predict its own action. Further, because L1 expects its partner’s 
message to be h and d with equal probabilities, both of its own messages have equal probabilities 
of being true. L1 therefore sends them with equal probabilities, independent of its action. 
Given L1’s strategy, L2 expects its partner’s message to be uninformative and its own 
message to be believed and accommodated. It therefore chooses action H and sends message h, 
in each case without regard to its own or its partner’s message. (But if for some reason it had 
chosen action D instead, it would have sent message d.)  
Given L2’s strategy, L3 expects its partner’s action to be H, its partner’s message to be 
truthful, and its own message to be ignored. If L3 receives message h, reinforcing its belief that 
its partner’s action will be H, then it accommodates, choosing action D. Because like L1, L3 
expects its own message to be ignored, but unlike L1 it expects its partner to choose action H, it 
sends the message it expects to be true, d. If L3 instead receives message d, contradicting its 
belief that its partner’s action will be H, then I assume, on the grounds that message preferences 
are weaker than action preferences, that L3 still expects its partner to choose H and still sends the 
                                                 
15 In Crawford and Iriberri’s (2007a) analysis of common-value auctions, they assume that level-k types can draw 
inferences about others’ private information from their bids, but not inferences about others’ types. In Crawford 
(2003) inferences from others’ messages about their types are drawn by the Sophisticated type (whose decisions are 
in equilibrium, taking non-equilibrium players’ decisions into account), but not by the level-k types. EÖ (Section 4) 
assume that even level-k types draw such inferences in their analysis of CHC’s Poisson cognitive hierarchy model, 
  13message it expects to be true, d. Thus L3 always chooses action D and sends message d. (But if it 
had chosen action H instead, it would have sent message h.) 
Given L3’s strategy, L4 expects its partner’s message to be truthful and its own message 
to be ignored. If L4 receives message d, reinforcing its belief that its partner’s action will be D, 
then it accommodates, choosing action H. Because L4 expects its own message to be ignored and 
expects its partner to choose action D, it sends the message it expects to be true, h. If L4 instead 
receives message h, contradicting its belief that its partner’s action will be D, L4 still expects its 
partner to choose D and still sends the message it expects to be true, h. Thus L4 always chooses 
action H and sends message h. (But if it had chosen action D, it would have sent message d.) 
C. Coordination outcomes 
Table 2 gives the messages for all types and the coordination outcomes on the non-
equilibrium path for all type pairings. “½H+½D, ½H+½D” refers to players’ independently 
random choices in L1 versus L1, which make all four possible outcomes equally likely. 
 
Type (message)  L1 (random) L2  (h) L3  (d)  L4 (h) 
L1 (random)  ½H+½D, ½H+½D  D, H  H, D  D, H 
L2 (h)  H, D  H, H  H, D  H, H 
L3 (d)  D, H  D, H  D, D  D, H 
L4 (h)  H, D  H, H  H, D  H, H 
Table 2. Level-k Messages and Outcomes with One Round of Communication 
 
There are three notable differences from Table 1’s coordination outcomes for the level-k 
model without communication. First, with one round of communication types other than L1 
always (without regard to the message sent or received) choose the action opposite to the one 
they choose without communication: L2 expects its messages to be believed and accommodated, 
and so sends h and chooses H; but without communication L2 expected L1 to choose H, and so 
accommodated by choosing D. To put it another way, returning to Section I’s Stackelberg 
analogy, without communication L1 is effectively committed (in L2’s mind) to choosing H; but 
with communication L1 is not committed not to listen, and this allows L2 to use its message to 
take over the leadership role. L3 expects its partner to choose H without regard to the messages 
and so accommodates, sending d and choosing D; but without communication L3 expected L2 to 
                                                                                                                                                             
where types above L1 have priors with positive weights on all lower types. Adding CHC’s cognitive-hierarchy types 
or Crawford’s Sophisticated type would cloud the waters here without adding insight. 
  14choose D, and so accommodated by choosing H. L4 expects its partner to choose D without 
regard to the messages and so accommodates, sending h and choosing H; but without 
communication L4 expected L3 to choose H, and so accommodated by choosing D. 
Second, in the pairing L1 versus L1, there are now equal probabilities of all four {H, D} 
combinations, instead of the H, H outcome without communication. This is because L1 expects 
its partner’s message to be truthful and its own message to be ignored. It therefore believes and 
accommodates its partner’s message but (unable to predict which message will be true) chooses 
its own message randomly, so that both L1s end up playing H and D with equal probabilities. 
L1’s communication skills here admittedly leave something to be desired, but its listening skills 
still yield a large improvement over the L1 versus L1 outcome without communication. 
Third, in the pairing L1 versus L3, L1 still chooses H but L3 now accommodates by 
choosing D. This is because L3 expects its partner to choose H, and so chooses D and sends d, 
while L1 sends a random message but expects its partner’s message to be truthful, and so ends up 
choosing H. Although L1 is not good at talking, it doesn’t matter because L3 is not listening. The 
improvement here is entirely due to L1’s listening skills, which suffice for coordination with L3. 
How much does one round of level-k communication improve coordination over Section 
I’s level-k outcomes without communication, or Section II’s equilibrium outcomes with one 
round? With symmetry across player roles ex ante, little is lost by focusing again on the 
coordination rate (ignoring changes from H, D to D, H, or vice versa). Comparing the level-k 
outcomes without communication (Table 1) and with one round (Table 2), respectively, the rate 
goes up from 0 to ½ for the pairing L1 versus L1, from 0 to 1 for the pairings L1 versus L3, and 
is otherwise unchanged.
16 Suppose for definiteness that the frequencies of L1, L2, L3, and L4 are 
r ≈ 0.4, s ≈ 0.3, t ≈ 0.2, and u ≈ 0.1 respectively, which are probably reasonable estimates 
(CGCB, CGC). Then the overall coordination rate without communication is 2(r+t)(s+u) ≈ 0.48, 
while with communication the overall coordination rate goes up by ½r
2 + 2rt, to 0.68. 
Comparing the level-k and equilibrium coordination rates with one round of 




2], which equals 3/4 when a = 1, 
                                                 
16 It is essential to consider all possible pairings, not only the ones assumed in the types’ beliefs. EÖ (Section 3.2) 
seem to focus on the pairings assumed in types’ beliefs (e.g. L2 versus L1), which rules out both pairings (L1 versus 
L1 or L3) in which one round of communication yields improvements. Thus, although my characterization of types’ 
strategies is consistent with EÖ’s, I do not concur with their conclusion that one round of two-sided communication 
yields “little overall coordination.” In fact, as shown shortly, the level-k coordination rate is quite likely to be higher 
than in the symmetric equilibrium either without communication or with one round of communication.  
  1528/45 when a = 2, and converges to 0 like 1/a as a → ∞. Thus when a ≈ 1 the coordination rate 
is likely to be somewhat higher for equilibrium than for a level-k model (0.75 versus 0.68), but 
even for moderate values of a, the level-k coordination rate is likely to be higher. 
D. Reevaluating Farrell’s assumptions about which message combinations create agreements 
  Now recall Farrell’s assumptions about which message combinations create agreements. 
Focusing on the model with one round of communication, he assumes that a message pair that 
identifies a pure-strategy equilibrium in Battle of the Sexes is treated as an agreement to play that 
equilibrium, and that players otherwise play the mixed-strategy equilibrium in that game. 
  As indicated in Table 2, on the non-equilibrium path L1 sends a random message, L2 and 
L4 send h, and L3 sends d. In all twelve possible pairings from {L1, L2, L3, L4}, message pairs 
that identify an equilibrium in Battle of the Sexes always lead to both players playing that 
equilibrium. Thus, taken literally, the analysis justifies Farrell’s assumption that a message pair 
that identifies an equilibrium is treated as an agreement to play that equilibrium. 
However, the resulting agreements do not reflect the meeting of the minds that FR sought 
to model. Instead they reflect either one player’s perceived credibility as a sender or the other’s 
perceived credulity as a receiver, but never both at the same time.
17 As a result, pairings of L1 
versus L2, L3, or L4 always lead to equilibrium play, without regard to whether or not the 
message pair identifies an equilibrium; and pairings of L1 versus L1 sometimes lead to 
equilibrium play, again without regard to whether or not the messages identify an equilibrium. 
(For pairings from {L2, L3, L4}, only agreements lead to equilibrium play, and of the “right” 
equilibrium; but for these pairings communication never enhances coordination.) L1’s listening 
skills bring about coordination often enough to raise the coordination rate well above the rate 
without communication. But a level-k analysis may not fully support the assumptions about 
agreements in Rabin’s analysis of negotiated rationalizability. 
 
                                                 
17 L1 can be described as a good listener but a bad talker. L2, by contrast, is a good talker but a bad listener; and L3 
and L4 are good talkers but mediocre listeners—mediocre because they choose the right action on the non-
equilibrium path, but they are too sure of their beliefs to respond to their partners’ messages when the messages 
contradict their beliefs. No type is both a good talker and a good listener, as would be required (at the least) for a full 
meeting of the minds. Higher-level types have communication skills no better than L1’s through L4’s. As Rabin 
notes, an equilibrium analysis also fails to explain a meeting of the minds, as opposed to assuming one. It is possible 
that a full meeting of the minds requires more than mechanical decision rules, something like a Gricean leap of the 
imagination (H. Paul Grice (1975)). Compare the notion of “team reasoning” in the experimental coordination 
literature (e.g. Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2007) and the references cited there).  
  16IV. A Level-k Model with Abundant Communication 
Although Section I’s level-k model of tacit coordination approximates the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium in Battle of the Sexes (with the type distribution purifying the equilibrium), it is not 
yet clear how close a level-k model with abundant communication will come to the outcome 
distribution of Farrell’s equilibrium with abundant communication. This section extends Section 
III’s analysis to allow abundant communication. It then compares level-k coordination outcomes 
with abundant communication to Section III’s outcomes with one round, and to the outcomes in 
Farrell’s equilibrium analysis of abundant communication. 
A. Modeling abundant level-k communication 
Recall that Farrell’s equilibrium analysis of abundant communication assumes that 
players continue exchanging messages indefinitely until an agreement is reached. I assume 
instead, in the spirit of Rabin’s analysis, that players can always agree to continue for an 
additional round of (two-sided) communication by mutual consent, but that in any round either 
player can unilaterally cut off communication and force play of the underlying game. Finally, I 
assume that players have a slight preference for avoiding additional rounds, all else equal.  
The model adds players’ options to request to continue communication to a multistage 
version of Section III’s model, as a pair of simultaneous decisions in each round following the 
exchange of messages. If both players request to continue, then communication continues for (at 
least) one more round. Otherwise the communication phase ends and players play the underlying 
game. As is usual in unanimity games, there is always an equilibrium in the request game in 
which neither player requests to continue. I simply assume that if continuing is better for both 
players, given their beliefs, then they both request to continue. 
I also assume, in the spirit of Section III’s model, that players draw no inferences about 
their partners’ types from the history of their interactions; and that in their request decisions they 
draw no conditional inferences about their partners’ types (as equilibrium players do in Timothy 
J. Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer’s (1996) analysis of the “swing voter’s curse”). The 
assumption that players draw no inferences from history is obviously strained for some outcome 
paths; I maintain it anyway to make the most important points as simply as possible.   
  17B. Types’ communication strategies with abundant communication 
  The analysis of types’ communication strategies with abundant communication builds on 
Section III’s analysis to determine which type pairs, following which realized message pairs in 
the current round, decide to exercise the option to extend communication.  
  Note first that both players requesting to continue communication can never be better for 
both players if their current messages already identify a pure-strategy equilibrium in Battle of the 
Sexes. If communication is cut off they will play that equilibrium, which is fully Pareto-efficient 
(not just efficient in the set of equilibria, which is not all that is relevant for level-k types). By 
continuing they incur the slight cost of an additional round of communication, and no deviation 
from the Pareto-efficient current agreement could make that worthwhile for both of them.  
  This implies (finding Table 2’s inefficient outcomes) that there are three kinds of type 
pair and realized message pair that might continue communication: L1 versus L1 following one 
of the message pairs, d,d or h,h, that don’t identify an equilibrium; L3 versus L3 following its 
normal message pair d,d; and L2 or L4 versus L2 or L4 following their normal message pair h,h. 
 First  consider  L1 versus L1 following message pair d,d. Each expects to play H against its 
partner’s D if communication is cut off, because each expects its partner’s message to be truthful 
and its own to be ignored. Given this, each is too sure of its optimistic beliefs to continue 
communicating. Instead, as Rabin’s analysis of negotiated rationalizability suggests is possible 
out of equilibrium, L1 versus L1 following message pair d,d cut off communication, and so play 
H, H in the underlying game.
18 
  L1 versus L1 following message pair h,h both expect to play D against their partner’s H if 
communication is cut off. These beliefs are too pessimistic, so they know there is potential for 
improvement. Even so, it may seem pointless to continue to communicate, because they know 
they will still be the same people who have just failed to reach an agreement in a round exactly 
like the one that would ensue. Recall however that L1’s message is random because L1 cannot 
predict its own action before receiving its partner’s message, so that both messages have equal 
expected payoffs and are equally likely to be true. If the randomness of L1’s message is an 
unstudied response to those indifferences—as for example in a logit error distribution—then the 
random outcomes need not be correlated each round, even though the setting is the same. Given 
this, the outcome if L1 versus L1 following message pair h,h continue will be a new random pair 
                                                 
18 I am grateful to Navin Kartik for correcting an error in my initial analysis of this case. 
  18of messages, with a new, positive probability of identifying an efficient equilibrium (compare 
Costa-Gomes’s (2002) “mutual grain of agreement” assumption). It is shown below that if they 
continue, the eventual outcome will be H, H; D, H; or H, D, each with probability 1/3, with 
expected payoff (1+a)/3. If they cut off communication, they expect to play D against H, with 
payoff 1. Thus it is better for them to continue if and only if (1+a)/3 > 1, or equivalently if a > 2.  
Summing up for L1 versus L1, in the first round each of the four possible message pairs is 
equally likely. If players send one of the pairs, d,h or h,d, that identify an equilibrium, then they 
cut off communication and play that equilibrium. If they send the pair d,d, then they cut off 
communication and play H, H. When a < 2, if they send the pair h, h they cut off communication 
and play D, D. When a > 2, if they send the pair h, h they continue communicating for (at least) 
one more round. In that case, under my assumption that the types draw no inferences from the 
history of their interactions, the process is a Markov chain, with all states but h,h absorbing. 
Letting x, y, and z be the probabilities that the process converges to H, H; D, H; or H, D 
respectively, the transition probabilities imply x = ¼ + ¼ x, y = ¼ + ¼ y, and z = ¼ + ¼ z. Thus x 
= y = z = 1/3, and the ex ante coordination rate of L1 versus L1 following message pair h,h is 2/3. 
For L1 versus L1 following message pair h,h when a > 2, the definition of L1 gracefully 
overcomes what might appear an insurmountable problem in extending Farrell’s equilibrium 
analysis of abundant communication to a level-k model: These models concern repeated 
interaction in fixed pairs, and Farrell’s use of communication to solve the coordination problem 
inherently relies on randomness. We are socialized to think that equilibrium players can and do 
consciously randomize. But it is conventional to assume (and I think empirically plausible) that 
level-k players cannot, or at least do not, consciously randomize. Fortunately, level-k players can 
unconsciously randomize, and the definition of L1 creates just the indifferences needed to make 
this work for L1 versus L1 following message pair h,h. 
Now consider L2 or L4 versus L2 or L4. Like L1 versus L1 following message pair d,d, 
these types are too optimistic to continue communicating. Instead they too cut off 
communication after the first round, and so play H, H in the underlying game. 
Finally, consider L3 versus L3. Like L1 versus L1 following message pair h,h, their 
beliefs are too pessimistic. But unlike L1’s messages, L3’s are deterministic, so they mat 
conclude that it is pointless to continue communicating anyway. If they do continue, they are 
doomed to repeat d,d forever and never reach an efficient agreement—for reasons completely 
  19different than those that prevented Luke in my epigraph from communicating with his prison 
captain. The only ray of hope is that, if they do continue communicating, and there is some 
exogenous randomness in how messages are sent or received, L3 versus L3 might eventually 
reach an efficient agreement by accident.
19  
C. Coordination outcomes 
Table 3 gives the coordination outcomes on the non-equilibrium path for all type pairings 
with abundant communication. As in Table 2, “½H+½D, ½H+½D” refers to the uniform 
distribution over the four possible coordination outcomes for L1 versus L1 following message 
pair h,h when a < 2. The outcomes with abundant communication are the same as with one 
round, except that if a > 2, L1 versus L1 now have coordination rate 2/3 instead of ½; and some 
exogenous randomness might allow L3 versus L3 to raise its coordination rate above its rate of 0 
with one round. Table 3 reflects the first change in that the L1 versus L1 cell now contains 
“1/3H, H + 1/3D, H + 1/3H, D if a > 2,” reflecting players’ 1/3 limiting probabilities of H, H; D, 
H; or H, D; and the second change in that the D, D outcome in the L3 versus L3 cell now has a 
question mark after it. 
 
Type  L1 L2  L3  L4 
L1  ½H+½D, ½H+½D if a < 2; 
1/3H, H + 1/3D, H + 1/3H, D if a > 2  D, H  H, D  D, H 
L2  H, D  H, H  H, D  H, H 
L3  D, H  D, H  D, D (?)  D, H 
L4  H, D  H, H  H, D  H, H 
Table 3. Level-k Outcomes with Abundant Communication 
 
Updating Section III’s calibration, with frequencies of L1, L2, L3, and L4 r ≈ 0.4, s ≈ 0.3, 
t ≈ 0.2, and u ≈ 0.1, if a > 2 the first change adds another r
2/6 ≈ 0.03 to the overall level-k 
coordination rate with abundant communication, raising it to approximately 0.71 from the rate of 
0.68 with one round and of 0.48 without communication. (If a < 2 the rate stays at 0.68.) The 
second change could conceivably add as much as t
2 (1–0) = 0.06, raising the coordination rate to 
approximately 0.77 or 0.74. Thus, with abundant communication the level-k coordination rate is 
                                                 
19 By contrast, such randomness in communication is superfluous for L1 versus L1 following message pair h,h and 
won’t significantly alter their chances of agreeing on an efficient equilibrium. And it won’t help L1 versus L1 
following message pair d,d or L2 or L4 versus L2 or L4 escape their traps, because their optimistic beliefs will still 
make them cut off communication after the first round. 
  20greater than the equilibrium coordination rate, 2/(1+a), which equals 1 when a = 1, 2/3 when a = 
2, and converges to 0 like 1/a as a → ∞, whenever a > 1.94 and possibly for lower values of a. 
To the extent that level-k types do better than in Farrell’s equilibrium, they do so because, as in 
Section I’s analysis, the level-k model relaxes the equilibrium incentive constraints. 
Just as for equilibrium, the benefits of abundant communication are limited and most of 
the gains from communication would be realized with only one round. (Here, oddly, the benefits 
of abundant communication are more limited when a is small, because L1 versus L1 following 
message pair h,h then cut off communication, reducing L1 versus L1’s coordination rate. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This paper has reconsidered FR’s analyses of coordination via preplay communication, 
focusing on Farrell’s analysis of Battle of the Sexes and replacing FR’s equilibrium and 
rationalizability assumptions with a structural non-equilibrium model based on level-k thinking. 
The analysis gives a unified treatment of players’ messages and actions and how messages create 
agreements, and allows a reevaluation of FR’s assumptions on how players use language. 
With one round of communication, the analysis justifies FR’s assumption that a message 
pair that identifies an equilibrium leads to that equilibrium. However, the resulting “agreements” 
do not fully reflect the meeting of the minds that FR sought to model. Instead they reflect either 
one player’s perceived credibility as a sender or the other’s perceived credulity as a receiver, 
never both at the same time. As a result, a level-k analysis may not fully support the assumptions 
about agreements in Rabin’s analysis of negotiated rationalizability. Further, with abundant 
communication, as Rabin’s analysis of negotiated rationalizability suggests, level-k players need 
not keep communicating until an agreement is reached as in Farrell’s equilibrium. 
Finally, a level-k analysis implies very different conclusions than Farrell’s equilibrium 
analysis about the effectiveness of communication in Battle of the Sexes. The level-k 
coordination rate in that game, unlike the equilibrium rate, is largely independent of the 
difference in players’ preferences. Even with moderate differences in preferences, for plausible 
type distributions the level-k coordination rate is likely to be higher than the equilibrium rate, 
with or without communication. The level-k model’s predictions with abundant communication 
are consistent with Rabin’s bounds based on negotiated rationalizability, but their precision 
yields additional insight into the causes and consequences of breakdowns in negotiations. 
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